Counterguerrilla operation (chapter 1)

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Section I. General

1-1. Overview.

This chapter discusses the type of activity that is characteristic of an

insurgency. A general overview of insurgency is provided to introduce

the planner of counterguerrilla operations to the insurgent. The host

government’s method to defeat the insurgency is discussed, as is the

difference between counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations.

The methods of response by United States (US) forces, and the general

doctrine for their use, are also presented.

1-2. Types of conflict.

a. The risk to national survival is greatest in a conventional conflict,

but the probability of such conflicts occurring is relatively low. On

the other hand, the risk to national survival is not as great in a

counterinsurgency conflict, but the probability of these types of

conflicts occurring is much greater.

b. Conventional conflicts imply a state of open belligerency between

nations and a direct confrontation of their armed forces. An

insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by

an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to

overthrow the legitimate government. counterguerrilla situations

faced by US forces are likely to occur in an insurgency environment,

but may also occur in conventional conflict environments.

Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict

(such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German

lines during World War II) are discussed in Chapter 4.

Section Il. Insurgency

1-3. Concept.

a. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by some

portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or

overthrow the existing government. Many of the methods of

resistance are part of the stock-in-trade of revolutionary activity.

There can be no revolution without a resistance movement, but

there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when the

objectives of the resistors do not envision a reallocation of power.
b. This concept applies to an organized insurgent movement that

seeks to overthrow the established government. In this manner,

an insurgent organization can be considered a type of resistance

organization.
b.

b. This concept applies to an organized insurgent movement that

seeks to overthrow the established government. In this manner,

an insurgent organization can be considered a type of resistance

organization.

1-4. Prerequisites.

There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can

occur.

a. Vulnerable population. For whatever the reasons — social,

political, or economic — the population is generally open to

change. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit

dissatisfaction with the current government.

Leadership available for direction. A vulnerable population

alone will “not support an insurgent movement. There must be a

leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied

populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent

strategy.

c. Lack of government control. Lack of government control may

be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has

over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent

success The opposite is also true: the less control the government

has, the greater is the chance for insurgent success.

1-5. Other required conditions.

There are a number of other conditions that must exist or be produced

for an insurgent movement to succeed.

a.Popular support. Support can be passive or active. It is not

necessary that the entire population actively support an

insurgency, but the majority of the population must passively

support it.

b.Unity of effort. The overall thrust of an insurgent movement

must provide a strength of unity that dedicates those involved to

achieving the same goal.

c.Will to resist. It is not enough for the population to resist their

government passively; at least a portion must be willing to resist

actively.

d.Leadership. The activities and effort of the insurgent movement

must be properly directed through the exercise of effective

leadership.

e.Discipline. The aspect of the movement must be strongly

maintained to ensure security and obedience.
f. Intelligence. Because the insurgent movement is usually

inferior in numbers and combat power in relation to government

forces, the intelligence effort must provide security for the

insurgent organization and information to conduct successful

operations.

g. Propaganda. It is used to gain popular support and intensify

the populace’s dissatisfaction with the government.

h. Favorable environment. This includes attitudes of the people,

the political environment, and the economic situation.

i. External support. The preceding eight conditions are theoretically

the only ones that an insurgency must have to succeed.

Historically, however, there seems to be one additional condition

that must exist the condition of external support. This support

may be physical or psychological. Examples of physical external

support are equipment, weapons, supplies, ammunition, sanctuaries,

personnel, and combat units. Examples of psychological external

support include the political support given to the resistance when

a country recognizes that movement in the world arena and the

pressure a government might exert politically or economically to

influence world opinion in favor of the movement.

1-6. Insurgent organization.

An insurgent organization may have both an overt and a covert

element. The overt element, the guerrilla, is readily identified. It is

supported by a clandestine element which makes up the insurgent

infrastructure. The insurgent organization also has political and

military structures.

1-7. Phases of development.

a. Once an insurgent organization is established and begins its

activities, it progresses through several phases in its effort to

overthrow the government. When the insurgency moves from one

phase to another is difficult to determine. The activities that occur

in the earlier phases will continue through the later phases. These

phases range from the weak insurgent movement until the time

the insurgent can confront government forces directly.

b. There is also the possibility that an insurgency may move directly

from Phase I to Phase III. Additionally, depending upon the lack

of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion from

Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.

(1) Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in

this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a

potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive

incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It

involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled

insurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct

continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism.

(2) Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached

when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient

local or external support, initiates organized continuous

guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the

government. This is an attempt to force government forces

into a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, he

begins to conduct larger operations.

(3) Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains

the force structure and capability to directly engage

government forces in decisive combat, then he will progres-

sively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain

combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to

conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to

protect the areas he controls.

c. The goal of the insurgent movement, if achieved, will result in the

replacement of the established government with a government

structure developed by the insurgent movement. If this occurs, it

is a political victory for the insurgents. The insurgent movement

does not need to defeat host country forces to accomplish this. A

parallel or “shadow” government may also be developed by an

insurgent force. It must, however, win the support of the people

away from the established government to achieve this political

victory.

Section Ill. Counterinsurgency

1 -8. Three target groups.

The government’s weapon to combat insurgency is counterinsurgency

(COIN). The COIN mission includes a full range of measures used by a

government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,

and insurgency. They are actions taken by a nation to promote its

growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic,

social) that respond to the needs of the people. There are three target

groups that the government addresses: the population, insurgents, and

external actors.

1-9. Population.

The government must win back the support of the people. It does this

through providing them security and showing an honest effort to

correct those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.

1-10 Insurgents.

a. The government must isolate the insurgent from the population,

both physically and psychologically, thereby denying him

personnel, materiel, and intelligence support.

b. The COIN strategy is based on the concept of balanced development,

mobilization, and neutralization. These three components are

interdependent and must occur simultaneously. If COIN strategy

achieves its goal, the government will regain populace support.

c. The military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six

major operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil

affairs, populace and resources control, advisory assistance, and

tactical operations. The successful employment of these operations

contributes to the success of the COIN program. They are

normally conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with each

other, and require close coordination of diverse government

agencies.

1-11. External actors.

Current insurgencies target on external actors for support, passive or

active. Both the government and the insurgents use this tactic. The

insurgent tries to separate the government from its foreign support.

The government seeks to retain its support and separate the insurgent

from his foreign support.

1-12. Counterinsurgency — counterguerrilla.

There is a difference in the terms counterinsurgency and counter-

guerrilla. The internal defense and development (IDAD) program is

geared to counter the whole insurgency. It does this through

alleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. This program,

which addresses both the populace and the insurgent, can be termed

counterinsurgency. Counterguerrilla operations are geared to the

active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end,

counterguerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of

the counterinsurgency effort.

Section IV. Foreign Internal Defense

1-13. example-US assistance.

a. All civil military action by a government to assist a host

government and to achieve a standard level of protection from

lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency is termed foreign

internal defense (FID). The United States (US) Army has been

assigned a major role in providing military assistance to selected

nations in support of US national interests. The degree of

participation by US Army units is determined by US policy and

interests, an analysis of the insurgent threat, and the capabilities

and desires of the host country’s government.

b. The introduction of US combat forces into an insurgency to

conduct counterguerrilla operations is something that is done

when all other US and host country responses have been

inadequate. US combat forces are never the first units into a

country. They are normally the last. Preceding them is an array of

advisors, security assistance forces, mobile training teams,

combat service support units, and combat support units. Combat

commanders deploying to conduct counterguerrilla operations

should understand this and the fact that neutralization of the

guerrilla is only one-third of the COIN strategy. Balanced

development of the country and mobilization of the populace

against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the

insurgency to be defeated.

1-14. US activities.

a. When deployed in FID operations, US forces ensure that their

planned activities support the goals and consequences of the host

country’s COIN program. Actions by US forces must not

undermine or be detrimental to COIN goals.

b. The response of US forces in any given situation must meet the

following requirements:

(1) Be appropriate — response is appropriate to the level of

threat and activity.

(2) Be justifiable – actions taken are justifiable in the eyes of

the host country’s population and the US public.

(3) Use minimum force — the goal is to restrict the use of force

and the level of commitment to the minimum feasible to

accomplish the mission. However, the principle of minimum

necessary force does not always imply minimum necessary

troops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may

enable a commander to use less force than he might

otherwise have done, or even to avoid using any force at all.

Commanders must, however, keep in mind that a peaceful

situation could become hostile because of the provocative

display of an overlarge force. Doing too much may be a

greater danger than doing too little.

(4) Do maximum benefit – US forces should select operations

so they accomplish positive benefit for the population. If this

is not possible then the operational concept is wrong and

should not be executed.

(5) Do minimum damage – US forces ensure that operations

preclude unnecessary damage to facilities, activities, and

resources. Since this is almost an impossibility, compensation

for any damage to property must be made and the property

restored, as much as possible, to its original state. In any

case, a major consideration is to plan activities to limit

damage.

Section V. AirLand BattIe and Counterguerrilla Operations

1-15. Challenges.

AirLand Battle is the Army’s operational concept for combat. It is

designed to deal with the worldwide challenges the Army faces. The

four basic challenges to the Army are the battlefield, leadership,

readiness, and training. The basic concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine

can be applied to counterguerrilla operations.

1-16. The battlefield.

The Army faces an enemy that may strike from any direction. It must

contend not only with military considerations in this environment but

with the political, economic, and social considerations which may

oftentimes outweigh military considerations. The Army must be able

to operate in all geographical areas and climates, and on all types of

terrain, with only the weapons, tactics, and assets permitted by the

political, social, and economic environment. The enemy will strike at

weak points and seek to avoid direct combat.

1-17. Leadership.

The complexities of counterguerrilla operations place a premium on

informed and trained leadership and independent operations. These

conditions demand more leader expertise and the ability to operate

independently at lower command levels than do higher levels of

conflict. The leader applies skill, imagination, and flexibility. He

effectively leads his troops and helps them to understand the problems

of counterguerrilla operations. He must be willing to reorganize his

assets to better accomplish his mission.

1-18. Readiness.

Units tasked to conduct counterguerrilla operations are prepared to

deploy and operate on short notice. Each soldier is prepared for battle

and is able to perform his duties. Units train to operate in areas of the

world where they may be tasked to fight.

1-19. Training.

Training is the cornerstone for success and a full-time job for

commanders. The commander ensures that soldiers are proficient

in traditional, basic skills and also familiar with more complex

skills required for success in a counterguerrilla environment.

These skills include intelligence, civil affairs, populace and

resources control, psychological operations, and advisory

assistance.

AirLand Battle concepts outline the principles the Army must

apply when engaged in combat. Combat operations based on this

doctrine seek to locate, harass, and neutralize the guerrilla force

and deny it the capability to conduct offensive actions by

severing its linkage with the population. Coordinated efforts of

military and civilian organizations are required to achieve the

overall objective.

1-20. Operational concepts for AirLand Battle.

Generally, the purpose of military operations is to defeat the

opposing force. The use of armed forces in a counterguerrilla role

is primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host

country to initiate counterinsurgency programs and pursue

national objectives.

The final resolution will not be by military means, but by

political, social, and economic action. With this in mind,

successful military operations are a means to an end. Success in

combat depends on the basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine:

initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.

(1) Initiative. To preserve the initiative, subordinates act

independently within the context of the overall plan. The

overall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to

the enemy’s initiatives. The characteristics of improvisation,

initiative, and aggressiveness, tempered with intelligent and

prudent decision-making, must be strong.

(2) Depth. This refers to time, distance, and resources. The

commander is able to operate overlarge areas with minimum

logistical support while retaining the ability to react to

unexpected attacks. This battle-in-depth is designed to delay,

disrupt, or destroy the guerrilla’s uncommitted forces and

base areas. Reserves are kept to a minimum to allow

maximum use of the force, while still retaining the capability

to meet most threats.

(3) Agility. This requires flexible organizations and leaders

who can quickly adapt to changing situations. The factors of

mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops (available),

and time (available) (METT-T) and the way they interface

with environmental considerations determine the type of

organization involved. The leader is innovative and flexible,

and he adapts to different situations. Mobility enhances the

agility of the force engaged in counterguerrilla operations,

but the force is not tied to its vehicles. At a minimum, the

force has mobility equal to that of the guerrillas.

(4) Synchronization. This means more than coordinated

action to achieve maximum combat power. In the counter-

guerrilla environment, it encompasses the effective, coordi-

nated use of available combat power and its interface with

noncombat operations. Tactical and nontactical, civilian

and military, host country and US force operations are

coordinated and supportive of each other to achieve the

overall objective. Additionally, US military operations are

aligned with US policy and aims in the host country. This in

turn may place certain restrictions on US forces.

1-21. Combat imperatives.

a. The seven combat imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine find

their basis in the principles of war. These imperatives are:
(1) Ensure unity of effort. The principles for this imperative

are the objective, unity of command, and simplicity. Unity of

effort requires the commander to understand the overall US

objective and how his operations support that objective. He

applies the principles underlying this imperative in such a

way that the effects of his operations are not a detriment to

attaining the overall US objective.

(2) Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.

The principles for this imperative are maneuver and

surprise. The commander minimizes and protects his

weaknesses and uses his strengths against the guerrilla’s

weak points. To do this, he knows the enemy’s organization,

equipment, and tactics. In addition to knowing how the

guerrilla fights, it is important for the commander to

understand why the guerrilla fights.

(3) Designate and sustain the main effort. The principles

for this imperative are mass and economy of force. The Army

cannot be everywhere at once. It cannot do everything at

once. Priorities are set at tactical and operational levels to

determine where the main effort is to occur and what goal is

to be achieved
(4)Sustain the fight. The force may have to operate for

extended periods on limited logistics. To sustain momentum,

the commander deploys forces in adequate depth and

arranges for service support when needed. The commander

is audacious and presses soldiers and systems to the limits of

endurance
(5)Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. The principles

for this imperative are maneuver and mass. Speed and

mobility are essential. To avoid detection, US forces employ

deception techniques, communications security (COMSEC),

and operations security (OPSEC). While the overall conflict

may be prolonged, the tactical operations are executed with

speed to retain initiative and freedom of action. This is

balanced against the need for patience.

(6)Use terrain and weather. The guerrilla force is familiar

with the terrain and comfortable with the climate. Recon-

naissance and intelligence (if accomplished effectively) give

the commander a decisive edge in anticipating difficulties

with terrain and weather. He uses both to his advantage.

(7)Protect the force. Successful commanders preserve the

strength of their force. They do so through security, keeping

troops healthy and equipment ready, and by sustaining

discipline and morale. The guerrilla seeks to degrade the

morale of the force through the use of psychological

operations (PSYOPS) and harassment. His tactics are

geared to wear down his opponent’s will to fight. The

commander trains his soldiers and constantly reminds them

of exactly what the mission is and why it is important to

complete the mission.

b. Doctrine is a guide that delineates principles and fundamental

concepts. The commander uses these principles and concepts

when analyzing the situation and then uses them as a guide in

selecting his actions.