“ The Threat'”
Section I. General
2-1. Operations.
a. The guerrilla must be understood before he can be defeated. This
chapter discusses the characteristics, tactics, and environment of
guerrilla operations.
b. The guerrilla is the overt combat element of the insurgent
organization. The members of the guerrilla force are organized
under military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary
operations. Their duties usually include all the overt actions that
are conducted by the insurgent organization but may include
covert and clandestine operations. They are usually most active
in insurgent-controlled or contested areas. However, when the
insurgency calls for operations in government-controlled areas,
the guerrilla may conduct these operations.
2-2. Aims and goals.
a.Support overall goal of the insurgent movement. To this
end, the guerrilla operates to support the major goal of the
insurgent movement to replace the established government.
b.Gain support for insurgent movement. The guerrilla tries to
gain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda,
coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support, then he will
seek passive support: Silence on the part of the populace
concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for
the insurgent.
c.Increase population’s vulnerability. Through the use of
selective terrorism, the guerrilla attacks or destroys economic and
political symbols upon which the government is founded.
Overreaction on the part of government forces or other elements
of authority contributes to the population’s dissatisfaction with
the government and its subsequent support to the insurgency.
d.Lessen government control. By defeating small government
forces and striking where government forces are not, the guerrilla
adds to the perception that the government cannot or will not
provide security for the population and its property. This adds to
the perception that the government cannot control the insurgents.
e.Provide psychological victories. To this end, the guerrilla
seeks to gain victories that psychologically benefit the insurgent
movement, whether or not these victories are significant in terms
of material damage to the government or its armed forces. It is the
psychological advantage the guerrilla seeks.
f. Tie up government resources. By forcing the government to
expend resources on military operations against the guerrilla, the
guerrilla seeks to tie up resources that could best be utilized by the
government in development programs.
g. Weaken resolve of government military forces. By defeating
smaller elements of the government’s military forces, the
guerrilla further weakens the usually limited assets the government
has available. He also psychologically weakens the government
forces’ resolve to continue waging war.
Section Il. - Environment
2-3. Factors.
The environment that the guerrilla operates in must be examined from
more than a geographical point of view. While terrain and climate are
important factors, the political, sociological, and economic aspects of
the environment take on added importance.
2-4. Terrain.
The rural guerrilla will prefer to continue to live in his own home. He
will go to camps if security does not permit him to live at home. He
favors level, well-drained campsites with good water supply, natural
fuel, cover, and adequate vegetation to provide concealment from
aerial observation. The preferred camps are also chosen with a view
toward easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or
neutral border, good escape routes, and good observation of approach
routes used by government counterguerrilla forces. When counterguerrilla
operations by government forces force the guerrilla out of his preferred
base camps, he tends to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas
not easily penetrated by government forces.
2-5. Climate.
The fact that the guerrilla is usually a native to the area and is used to
the climate gives him an added advantage. If the government forces
are also familiar with this type of climate, then the advantage to the
guerrilla is lessened. If the government forces are not familiar with
operating in the climate, then the advantage to the guerrilla increases.
Generally, the climate of the area does not favor either the guerrilla or
the government forces to any great degree unless there are extremes
involved. Then the impact is on the logistical systems.
2-6. Political factors.
The amount of government control in a given area directly impacts on
the ability of the guerrilla to operate. The more government control, the
less successful are guerrilla activities, whereas less government
control of an area improves chances for guerrilla success. The guerrilla
will attempt to disrupt normal government functions and destroy key
government facilities and personnel to reduce the level of government
control in an area.
2-7. Sociological factors.
The more fragmented a society is, the greater the opportunity for
dissatisfaction among the populace. The guerrilla will attempt to
increase friction between different groups in society. These groups may
be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language
differences or tradition may also be a reason for alignment. Religious
influences may play a significant role in the sociological factors that
affect the guerrilla.
2-8. Economic factors.
Low standards of living and desires for economic reforms may be
popular causes of dissatisfaction with the government. As with
political and sociological factors, the greater the degree of dissatisfaction
with the government’s economic policies, the better the guerrilla’s
chances for success. The guerrilla seeks to exploit this situation
through the use of psychological operations. Since the guerrilla derives
a major portion of his logistical support from the local economy, he will
normally not disrupt it drastically. Guerrilla forces will destroy a local
economy of an area as a lesson to the people living there to exact more
support or obedience from them.
2-9. Impact.
a. The impact that each of the factors has on the guerrilla, and his
ability to successfully operate, changes in each situation. A
careful analysis by the commander and his staff of each of the
factors is necessary to determine what the impact of each is prior
to conducting counterguerrilla operations. In all cases, each
factor must be analyzed to determine the peculiarities, weaknesses,
and strengths it may have in relation to the guerrilla.
b. In planning for counterguerrilla operations, the commander
exploits disclosed guerrilla weaknesses and deprives the
guerrilla, wherever possible, of any opportunities to exploit
government weaknesses.
Section Ill. Characteristics
2-10. Considerations.
a. By understanding the general characteristics of the guerrilla, it is
easier to determine strengths which must be reduced or avoided
and weaknesses which can be exploited.
b. The characteristics discussed are general, and the commander
planning counterguerrilla operations must analyze a particular
situation to discover how these considerations apply.
2-11. Guerrilla strengths.
a. Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the infrastructure
usually provide continuous and current information on government
force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. The
need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent
organization makes government penetration and disruption of
these intelligence networks difficult. However, their structures
are vulnerable to penetration and careful, detailed analysis.
Intelligence collecting and analyses must be placed on a robust
footing early to build data bases. Pattern analysis and other
techniques can rob the guerrilla of this advantage. counterguerrilla
forces can also overcome this intelligence advantage through the
comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and
communications security.
b. Indigenous characteristics.
(1) Guerrillas usually have the ability to blend with the local
populace. In many cases they are part of the local populace.
This enhances their capability to operate with secrecy in a
given area.
(2) The counterguerrilla force must identify the guerrilla and
remove him from the civilian populace. This is best
accomplished through the effective use of population and
resources control.
(3) Care must be taken to ensure that civilians are not injured or
mistreated as a result of counterguerrilla operations.
c. Knowledge.
(1) The guerrilla’s knowledge of the local populace and terrain is
a strength. It gives him the ability to utilize psychological
operations effectively. The guerrilla can usually develop a
working relationship with the populace because they
identify to some degree with his cause. If he cannot persuade
them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerrilla
force must try to overcome this advantage by fostering a
strong relationship between the government forces and the
populace. The creation of a local civilian defense force by the
government and the counterguerrilla force’s cooperation
with it is one way to do this.
(2) By knowing the environment he operates in, the guerilla has
a major advantage. This advantage may be overcome by
continuous counterguerrilla operations in a given area by a
permanently stationed counterguerrilla force and skillful
use of native assets.
d.Motivation and discipline. The guerrilla leaders are trained
and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla
force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually,
the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of
fanaticism.
e.Limited responsibilities. The guerrilla usually does not have
the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations
toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in
support of the insurgency goals. However, the guerrilla force may
be tasked to perform certain political services (such as tax
collection) by the insurgency shadow government.
f.Tactics. The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from
terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enables
him to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost at
will.
g.Physical condition.
(1) Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their
years of greatest physical stamina. One of the major
advantages the guerrilla has is his ability to endure
hardship. Usually, because of the situation, he has to make
do with less. This forces him to adapt and be innovative.
(2) The general strengths described are designed to provide a
base to analyze the specific guerrilla threat. No two guerrilla
forces are identical. These strengths are applied against the
specific situation being addressed. Whatever the results of
that analysis, the obvious strengths must be reduced or
circumvented.
2-12. Guerrilla weaknesses.
a. Limited personnel and resources. The guerrilla normally
lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become
decisively engaged with government forces. Difficulty in
recruitment and resupply to replace his combat losses in
personnel and materiel may limit his operations. The counter-
guerrilla force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting
supply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because of
hardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard to
replace.
b. Individual factors. Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of
physical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited by
counterguerrilla forces. Numerically inferior to the government
forces facing him, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured by
the government, and fear of violence to himself and his family
(imposed by the guerrilla organization to ensure his cooperation)
are stress factors in addition to constant combat and a hostile
environment that weaken guerrilla resolve. In some societies,
good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation
in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of
criminal punishment to induce guerrilla desertions.
c. Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include
security, which requires extensive resources and slows down
responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate;
and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured
high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on
popular support is also a weakness, since if that support wavers or
is withdrawn, then the guerrilla will not be able to operate
effectively. Another operational weakness may be the lack of
sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla
to spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch an
operation.
2-13 Guerrilla support
.
A major concern common to all guerrillas is support. Support can be
divided into two general categories.
a. Popular support.
(1) As discussed previously, the guerrilla must have either the
active or passive support of the populace to succeed. Popular
support alone will not ensure the success of guerrilla
operations. Ineffective operations, unwise decisions, and
poor leadership are examples of deficiencies that would
preclude his success. Popular support should be viewed,
instead, as a condition that must exist for the guerrilla to
initiate and conduct operations in a given area over a period
of time. If popular support does not exist or is withdrawn, the
guerrilla will not be able to conduct operations with any hope
of success. Therefore, one of the prime considerations for the
counterguerrilla force is to gain and maintain the support of
the populace. Areas where active support is given to the
guerrilla are excellent targets for psychological operations.
Populace and resources control operations will play a vital
role in winning support away from the guerrilla.
(2)In areas where only passive support is given to the guerrilla,
then government efforts through psychological operations
and civil affairs, as well as the provision of security, must be
initiated to gain active support and trust of the government.
In areas that the government controls and where the
populace supports the government, increased emphasis is
placed on all six major operations in IDAD to maintain that
support.
b. Logistical support.
(1) This is one of the guerrilla’s most vulnerable areas. In early
operations, the guerrilla relies on his base of popular support
for logistical requirements. As the guerrilla force develops
and expands, its logistical needs may increase to the point
that the internal support base can no longer provide for all of
the guerrilla’s logistical requirements. If the insurgent
movement has not reached the point where the attainment of
its overall goals is imminent, then the guerrilla may have to
receive additional logistical support from another source.
(2) If the guerrilla receives support from external sources, then
he is faced with the problem of security for supply lines,
transport means, and storage facilities. External support
should not be considered a prerequisite for the initiation of
counterguerrilla operations. It is an additional factor that, if
present and effective, will enhance the capabilities of the
guerrilla. In any case, the counterguerrilla force should seek
to interdict the logistic support that the guerrilla is receiving,
whether it be internal or external.
(3) Since the guerrilla operates along military lines, he will
usually have temporary sites for headquarters, installations,
facilities, and operational units. These temporary sites are
called guerrilla base camps. It is in these camps that the
guerrilla has his command posts, training areas, communi-
cations facilities, medical stations, and logistics centers. The
guerrilla may also use these camps for rest, retraining, and
reequipping.
(4) It must be understood that these camps do not equate with
conventional force operational bases since the guerrilla does
not seek to defend them if they are discovered. They are
temporary and depend on secrecy for their existence. If
discovered, the guerrilla will usually abandon the site and
move his operation. These bases are kept small, and usually
there is more than one base in the guerrilla’s area of oper-
ation.
(5) Characteristics of a base camp area are:
(a) Cover and concealment. The guerrilla will attempt
to locate base camps in areas where cover and con-
cealment provide security against detection.
(b) Rough, inaccessible terrain. Usually, the rougher
the terrain, the less likely is the chance of being
surprised by government forces. Terrain is chosen to
provide security against detection. Key terrain, as seen
by the conventional force, is usually avoided. While
guerrillas avoid defensive combat, they emphasize
short-term defensive action in the base camp vicinity to
aid evacuation, if necessary.
(c) Suitable for bivouac. The area selected is a suitable
bivouac area. Consideration is given to food and water
supply, grade or slope of terrain, access to trails, and
protective environment.
(d) Remoteness. Base camps are usually in relatively
remote areas for security. To preclude accidental
discovery, base camps are not usually near inhabited
areas. However, because the guerrilla must be able to
fill his logistical needs, his base camp usually will not
be more than one day’s march from a village or town. If
the counterguerrilla force can locate and disrupt these
camps, then the guerrilla can be kept off balance and
on the run, allowing the counterguerrilla force to gain
the initiative.
Section IV. Tactics
2-14. Terrorism and harassment.
a. When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually
engage in limited or small-scale activities and operations. If they
reach more sophisticated levels of organization, equipment, and
training, then larger operations utilizing more conventional
tactics may be expected.
b. Guerrilla tactics are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and
brief, violent action. These tactics in the early phases can be
divided into terrorism and harassment.
(1) Terrorism. The guerrilla may use terrorism if it fits a given
situation and accomplishes his goals. Terrorist techniques
include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats,
mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. It must be
recognized that all guerrillas do not use terrorism as a tool. If
terrorism is utilized, it is usually for coercion, provocation, or
intimidation.
(a) Coercion. This is used to persuade individuals to act
favorably in given situations toward the guerrilla or
the insurgent movement. As an example, terrorism
might be used to persuade a local mayor to revise policy
concerning the guerrilla.
(b) Provocation. This is used to provoke an overreaction
on the part of government forces so that the population
will be alienated by government forces’ actions.
Targets are usually government soldiers, leaders, or
policemen.
(c) Intimidation. This is used to modify behavior.
Usually, threats or fear of harm, either to the individual
or his family and friends, are used. Intimidation can be
used to induce the populace to silence or noncooperation
with government forces. It is used to discourage
competent citizens from accepting critical low-level
governmental positions.
(2) Harassment.
(a) Most guerrilla operations are offensive, not defensive.
There is seldom an attempt to seize and defend
objectives for any length of tome.
(b) The guerrilla uses dispersion during his movements,
but near the target area, small guerrilla elements mass
and then conduct operations.
(c) While the guerrilla is outnumbered by government
forces, he seeks to attain local numerical superiority. In
this way he can attain victory over small elements of
the government forces. These tactics, if successful,
compel government forces to commit larger elements to
defensive tasks. Once government forces move to the
defensive, they lose the initiative and become reactive.
This allows the guerrilla time and space to develop to a
point where he has the capability to engage larger
government forces with more conventional tactics.
(d) The most common techniques employed by the guerrilla
are the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks. These
techniques are usually targeted against security posts,
small forces, facilities, and lines of communication.
(e) Harassing tactics are utilized to keep government
forces on the defensive. If successful, they make
government forces react to guerrilla operations, taking
away the government’s ability to conduct offensive
operations that would prevent successful guerrilla
operations.
(f) Harassing tactics are also effective in weakening the
government’s resources and disrupting lines of com-
munication. One advantage of harassment is the
perceived image it gives of the guerrilla being able to
strike anywhere at will. It also makes the government
appear ineffective and incompetent by continuously
losing small battles.
2-15. Mao’s principles.
The principles of guerrilla tactics have been stated by China’s Mao
Tse-Tung:
• Enemy advances, we retreat.
• Enemy halts, we harass.
• Enemy tires, we attack.
• Enemy retreats, we pursue.o
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