Counterguerilla operation (CHAPTER 3)-part 1

Counterinsurgency Operations

Section I. General

3-1. Different conditions.

a. As described in chapters 1 and 2, the nature of counterguerrilla

operations differs from the conditions most soldiers expect to face

in combat. The counterguerrilla commander faces an enemy

whose objectives, tactics, and concepts are usually different from

his own.

b. This chapter examines the role of tactical counterguerrilla

operations in relation to the COIN program. In addition, it

discusses planning considerations and principles for the

successful conduct of counterguerrilla operations, as well as

related operations that the counterguerrilla force must be

acquainted with.

3-2. US role(example).

The most common role in which US forces will conduct counterguerrilla

operations will be as a foreign internal defense (FID) force.

The FID is designed to support the host country’s national objectives

and COIN plan. Two of the primary considerations for the FID

commander are the final goals of the host country COIN program and

how to coordinate his operations to support hose goals.

Section Il. Considerations

3-3. FID operations.

a. Most US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations will be

part of an FID force. The commander must understand how FID

operations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, the

goals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the FID

force and the counterguerrilla commander.

b. The primary consideration when planning counterguerrilla

operations is the effect operations will have on the populace.

Commanders must attempt to win the active support of the

population for the government. At a minimum, counterguerrilla

activities must eliminate incidents which the guerrilla may

exploit in his psychological operations.

3-4. Support of coin.

a. US forces committed to FID in the host country have a dual

mission. First, they must defeat or neutralize the guerrilla

militarily so the host country government can begin or resume

functioning in previously contested or guerrilla-controlled areas.

Second, they must support the overall COIN program by

conducting noncombat operations to provide an environment

where the host country government can win the trust and support

of its people and ultimately become self-sustaining. Both aspects

of the COIN mission are of equal importance and are usually

conducted simultaneously.

b. A common mistake made by FID forces when trying to gain

popular support is that they sometimes win popular support only

for themselves. The commander must ensure that popular

support, in the end, is for the host country government. Credit for

successful campaigns against the guerrillas, or programs to help

the people, should go to the host country government and not to

the FID force commander.

3-5. Purpose of tactical operations.

Tactical counterguerrilla operations are conducted to reduce the

guerrilla threat or activity in the area, and to provide a favorable

environment for the host country’s development program. These

purposes are complementary. When the guerrilla threat is reduced,

internal development can begin, and when internal development

works, the causes of dissatisfaction which gave rise to the insurgency

are alleviated. This deprives the guerrilla of both popular support and a

reason for fighting (which he needs to survive).

3-6. Planning considerations — METT-T.

a. Mission.

(1) Foreign internal defense operations fall into six areas:

(a) Intelligence operations.

(b) Psychological operations.

(c) Populace and resources control operations.

(d) Military-civic action.

(e) Tactical operations (both strike and consolidation).

(f) Advisory assistance.

(2) The combat brigade is most often concerned with tactical

operations, but because of the nature of counterguerrilla

warfare, a specific tactical operation or campaign willprobably involve elements of the five other operations to

some degree. The commander’s guidance for counterguerrilla

operations is more detailed and comprehensive than for

more conventional operations and must accommodate all

operational aspects inherent in brigade counterguerrilla

operations.

(3) Before receipt of a specific mission, the commander’s

guidance and subsequent planning is based on all probable

missions, to include supporting consolidation operations or

conducting strike operations, as well as on the specific

characteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in the

specific operational area. After receipt of the mission, his

guidance becomes more specific and includes the extent to

which the brigade will become involved in each of the six

areas of FID operations

b. Enemy. When evaluating the guerrilla capabilities and limitations,

the commander considers:

(1) National and regional origins.

(2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

(3) Strength, morale, and status of training.

(4) Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.

(5) Capability to attack, defend, and reinforce.

(6) Resources available:

(a) Food and water.

(b) Arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, and

neclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective equipment

(agents, detection devices, and employment assets);

external support — personnel, materiel, and morale.
(7) Leaders and their personalities.

(8) Relations with the civilian population.

(9) Status of supplies.

(10) Effectiveness of communications.

(11) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, to

include the extent of infiltration of host country civil and

military establishments.

(12) Lines of communications.

(13) Vulnerabilities.

(14) External support.

c. Terrain and weather. When evaluating the effects of terrain

and weather on counterguerrilla operations, the commander

considers:

(1) Effects of seasons of the year (to include planting and

harvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides.

Particular attention is focused on the effects of the weather

on men, equipment, visibility, and mobility (on both US

forces and the guerrilla).

(2) Suitability of terrain (to include landing zones and pickup

zones) and road nets for tactical and logistical operations. As

with weather, particular attention is focused on the effects

the terrain has on men, equipment, visibility, and mobility

(on both US forces and the guerrilla).

d. Troops and resources available.

( 1) The commander has a variety of combat, combat support,

and combat service support assets at his disposal. These

assets may be from US forces and civilian agencies, or from

host country forces and civilian agencies, or from a

combination of all these.

(2) Successful counterguerrilla operations depend upon the

commander utilizing his available assets to maximize their

strengths and minimize their weaknesses. To do this, the

commander realistically appraises the capabilities and

limitations of his assets and then organizes and employs

them on suitable missions. Oftentimes, the commander finds

he lacks assets which would greatly facilitate mission

accomplishment. In these instances, he should request what

he needs from his higher headquarters. If his needs cannot

be met, he has the option of improvising a solution or doing

without.

(3) The peculiar circumstances of counterguerrilla warfare

require that senior commanders allow subordinate leaders,

at all levels, a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing their

missions.

e. Time.

(1) Time is relative. The conditions leading to the development

of the insurgency did not appear overnight, and they will not

disappear overnight, either.

(2) US forces involved in FID operations should anticipate

staying in the host country only as long as required to

complete their mission. Usually, this will only be as long as it

takes the host country forces to assume missions the

counterguerrilla force is accomplishing. No matter how
successful FID forces are militarily, the insurgency is not

defeated until the political, economic, and social problems

which led to it are corrected or significantly alleviated. This

usually takes a considerable length of time.
(3)In the area of tactical operations, time available for planning

and execution varies. When planning for long-term actions,

such as consolidation campaigns, a long lead time is

necessary to permit planning in meticulous detail. However,

when planning shorter term actions, such as strike campaigns

or offensive operations against fleeting guerrilla targets,

planning time is usually short
(4)Commanders at all levels can use the time available to them

more efficiently by planning for contingency missions. Lack

of hard information precludes planning in detail, but routine

tasks common to similar missions should be codified in

standing operating procedures (SOP) and understood by all

concerned. When the need to execute a contingency mission

arises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planning

expedited by making minor adjustment as required
(5)Planning time is often extremely limited. Warning and

operation orders are normally issued orally. In these

instances, the one-third rule applies: the commander utilizes

one third of the available time for his own planning and

allows two thirds of the available time for his subordinates to

develop their plans and issue their orders. In many cases,

planning time will be so limited that formal planning is

precluded. In these instances, commanders direct their

subordinates by using fragmentary orders.

3-7 Restrictions.

a.US forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations function under

restrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. These

restrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy the

guerrilla. For example, the safety of noncombatants and the

preservation of their property is vitally important to winning

them over to the government’s side
b.The guerrilla knows this and will attempt to capitalize on it by

engaging US forces at locations where US fire would endanger

civilians or damage their property. While the temptation to return

fire may be great, a few dead or injured enemy will in no way

compensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocent

civilians are killed or injured or their homes and property

destroyed
c.Political considerations influence the conduct of counterguerrilla

operations. It is essentially a contest between the host government
and guerrillas concerning political, social, religious, or economic

issues. The government and its representatives must present

themselves and their program as the better choice
d. Commanders must be prepared to operate in a broad range of

political atmospheres. The host country’s form of government

may be anything from an absolute, and not too benevolent,

dictatorship to a democracy struggling to establish itself, or

anything in between.
e. No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country,

the brigade commander must engage the guerrilla with every

asset at the commander’s disposal. He must realize that

democratic principles may not be immediately applicable.

However, he should act within the limits of his authority to

improve the circumstances of the government he was sent to

support. Any incidents of deep-rooted corruption, gross inefficiency,

or violation of human rights should be documented and reported

to higher headquarters. The commander can also offer other

alternatives to accomplish the same objective. -It is the responsibility

of the US Government to influence the host

government’s attitude toward democratic principles; it is

not the responsibility of the commander.
f . There will be situations where well-defined responsibilities in a

local area may not be readily apparent. It is the duty of the higher

headquarters to determine these responsibilities and make them

known prior to the insertion of US forces, especially in the

execution of strike missions. However, there maybe eventualities

in which the counterguerrilla force commander may be required to

coordinate with numerous governmental officials to locate

sources of authority and decision. If the commander encounters

government officials who habitually hinder operations against

the guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected

sympathy for the guerrilla cause, he should document his case

and forward it to the next higher commander for disposition.
3-8. Operating principles.
a. Intelligence. Tactical intelligence is the key to defeating the

guerrilla. It provides the commander with information about

guerrilla locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and plans

which enable the commander to seize the initiative. Without

intelligence sources, the chances of success (particularly in

offensive operations) are limited and the commander must react

to guerrilla initiatives rather than controlling the situation in the

area of operations. Every relevant source of information about the

commander’s area of operation should be exploited and include:
1-The brigade intelligence section (and augmentation):

(a) Ground surveillance radar (augmentation from

division).

(b) Ground sensors (augmentation from division).

(c) Long-range surveillance unit (augmentation from

division).

(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e) Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).
2-The maneuver battalion’s intelligence section and reconnaissance

platoons.
3-The maneuver companies’ sightings and reports (combat

information).
4-Combat support units’ target acquisition batteries, military

police, chemical reconnaissance units (if available), and

sightings and reports (combat information).
5-Combat service support units’ sightings and reports (combat

information).
6-Other sources:

-Local populace.

-Intelligence agents (from division and corps).

-Host government civilian agencies.

-Captured enemy documents (from division and corps).

-Enemy prisoners (from division and corps).

-Intercepted enemy communications (from division and

corps).

-Special operation forces.
b. Tactical situation. The organization for, and conduct of,

counterguerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation.

Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrilla

threat. For example, if guerrillas are operating in platoon-size

units, then platoon- or company-size units are used against them.

These units conduct independent operations such as patrols and

ambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). This

enables them to cover more area simultaneously than a larger

unit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrilla

unit they might encounter. Employing a large force to counter a

significantly smaller guerrilla force is inefficient because it

compromises the chance of achieving surprise, reduces the area
that can be covered at any one time, and is more difficult to move

(than a smaller force) if it is required elsewhere. However, sending

a small force to counter a significantly larger guerrilla force may

prove disastrous unless the smaller force is supported by fire or

can be rapidly reinforced.
c. Flexibility. Forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations are

flexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing tactical

situations. The nature of counterguerrilla warfare necessitates

being able to make swift transitions from large to small unit

operations; to adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, and

visibility; to move on foot, by vehicle, or by aircraft; and to

function in offensive or defensive modes. Adapting to changing

tactical situations keeps the guerrilla force off balance and

prevents it from developing effective tactical operations.

d. Mobility
(1) Counterguerrilla forces most possess mobility equal to or

greater than that of the guerrilla in order to find, fix, fight,

and pursue him. Since the guerrilla is primarilly footmobile,

counterguerrilla forces equipped with motorized, mechanized,

or air transportation assets would appear to have a

significant mobility advantage. However, the guerrilla

typically operates from terrain that precludes (or severely

limits) speed on a ground approach. The counterguerrilla

force’s mobility advantage may not be as great as it first

appears to be. When terrain, weather, or the guerrilla force

disposition precludes closing on guerrilla positions by

high-speed air or ground transport, then counterguerrilla

forces should be moved by the fastest available transportation

to the nearest suitable, safe area to launch footmobile

operations. A well-trained, footmobile counterguerrilla force,

that can use terrain better than the enemy, can achieve a

tactical mobility advantage
(2) Commanders should not overburden soldiers with excessive

loads because the guerrillas will be able to outrun them.

Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find and

fix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can be

resupplied by ground or air.

e. Minimum use of force.
(1) Only the minimal firepower needed to accomplish a given

mission is employed. If US forces come under guerrilla fire,

and if by returning fire noncombatant civilians maybe

injured or their homes and property destroyed, then only the

amount of fire necessary to protect US forces is returned.

Under these circumstances, the commander attempts to

suppress the guerrillas with minimal return fire (possibly
using snipers) and moves his forces to advantageous

positions from which he may engage the guerrillas while not

endangering civilian life or property. He may use smoke and,

if authorized, riot control agents to facilitate maneuver. If

the guerrillas cannot be engaged without endangering

civilian life or property, the commander moves his forces

(over covered or concealed routes) to positions that cut off

their escape routes and encircle them. Then he begins to

tighten the ring around them.

(2) The unrestricted use of firepower in the vicinity of civilians

or their property will result in turning their anger toward the

government and may turn them to the insurgent cause. US

soldiers must understand this and follow strict rules of

engagement. However, the right to self defense is never

denied.

(3) All available fire may be brought to bear on guerrillas when

it does not endanger civilian life or property. However, the

expenditure of ammunition should be appropriate: mortars

to knock out a machine gun position; small arms to kill a

sniper. The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases,

is not a substitute for maneuver.
f. Patience. Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periods

without making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumbered

and outgunned and avoids engagement unless it is on his terms.

Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense of

security if it appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in their

area. It must be assumed that the guerrilla is always observing

the operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weak

points, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. A

guerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

g. Reserves.(1) The commander always maintains a reserve to take

advantage of sudden opportunities, and to counter guerrilla

initiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of its

parent unit and the tactical situation.

(2) In offensive operations, a company might keep a squad in

reserve; battalions, a platoon; and brigade, a company.

(3) In defensive operations, because of the need for 360-degree

security, a reserve at company and battalion is complicated

by the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter is

reduced.

(4) The company or battalion commander may have to spread

his forces thin to protect his perimeter. In these instances,

the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally
located reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establish

no reserve but specify units on-line to be prepared to shift a

portion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter;

establish no reserve but reinforce the most heavily contested

section of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing the

size of the perimeter.
(5)Brigades too should maintain a company in reserve in

defensive operations. This mission should be rotated among

companies, with the company that has spent the most time

in the field (or that has seen the heaviest action) being

designated as the reserve. The reserve company can rest,

rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission
(6)The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is the

preferred method for moving the reserve because it is fast

and not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized or

mechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode of

transportation, the reserve’s vehicles are dedicated to the

reserve and immediately available for employment
(7)Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If the

reserve is committed, the commander designates a new

reserve. In this case, his least committed unit is the first

choice.

Section III. Strike Campaigns
3-9. Targets.

This section provides guidance on the organization, missions,

concepts, and operations of strike campaigns. Strike campaigns

consist of a series of major combat operations targeted against

insurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlled

zones. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces

during strike operations. Strike campaign operations are usually of

relatively short duration (generally, one day to several weeks). While

the guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade, this

section may be extended to apply to any combined arms organization

conducting counterguerrilla operations.

3-10. Organization.

Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved from

area responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, are

constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels.

Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces

capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigades

are assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committed

to operations.

3-11. Missions.

Strike campaigns are conducted against guerrilla forces and bases.

They serve to keep guerrilla forces moving and off balance. Strike

campaign areas are usually outside of those undergoing consolidation

or those under friendly control. Ground or water means of entry maybe

used, but air assault or parachute deliveries can be employed.

3-12. Concepts.

a. Strike campaigns include offensive tactics such as raids,

reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit

(or combinations of these operations).

b. Brigade strike campaign operations are conducted to:
(1) Harass the guerrilla to prevent the buildup of personnel and

logistical resources.

(2) Destroy the guerrilla force and its base complexes.

(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for the

populace in the local area.

(4) Expand consolidation areas.

3-13. Operations.
a. Brigades committed to strike campaigns are assigned a tactical

area of responsibility. The brigade commander normally assigns

operational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn,

may assign areas to companies. Company commanders may

assign specific areas to platoons at times; however,’ platoons are

normally assigned specific missions rather than operational

areas. Each battalion normally establishes a separate operational

support base (OSB). Companies normally operate from patrol

bases, but at times may operate separate company OSBs. When

the areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoitered

concurrently by subordinate units, commanders establish an

order of priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion commanders maintain reserve forces (ready forces) to

react quickly to situations requiring an immediate response. Each

rifle company patrols its area of operations continuously and

aggressively. The location of the company patrol base and patrol

routes are varied to ensure complete coverage of the area.

c. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the company

patrol base with sufficient supplies to permit limited independent

operations. If it is to operate in the same area for a period of time, it

should consider establishing small ration and ammunition

reserves.
d. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day

and night with emphasis on night patrols. Generally, platoon-size

patrols have sufficient firepower to handle the situation if a

guerrilla force is encountered. If additional support is needed, the

company commander may maneuver his other platoons against

the guerrillas, or he may request assistance from the battalion

reserve (ready force). Emphasis is placed on engaging the

guerrilla with organic means of fire and movement (if required)

and on employing supporting artillery and air support.

e. Orders issued to the company commanders include the area

assigned and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations is

based on decentralized planning and execution. Company

commanders plan and coordinate platoon activities to ensure

completion of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrol

carry light rations and store unneeded equipment at OSBs.

f. Rifle company mortars may (at times) be located in battalion

OSBs while fire support teams (FIST) move with the companies. If

the terrain and situation permit, battalion OSBs may be moved as

the companies move their patrol bases. If civilian communities

are in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion bases

may be near (but not within) the community. Here, the battalion

may conduct psychological, intelligence, and military-civic

action operation.

g. Brigade commanders use all available means to locate guerrilla

forces and bases, and they give priority to destroying the guerrilla

forces. An attack on a guerrilla force normally requires superior

combat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to immediately

engage and destroy moving guerrilla forces before they can

disperse. Depending on the situation, either hasty or deliberate

attacks are made on guerrilla bases that contain fortifications.

After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, troops thoroughly

search the area for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and

documents. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy or

capture forces attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and air

assault forces support ground pursuit.

h. The brigade does not normally occupy the area defensively for an

extended time following a successful attack. Operations to search

out guerrillas continue. Elements of the brigade may be rotated

through the brigade support base for periods of rest and training.

i. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations, especially

when attacking a known guerrilla stronghold. The sudden and

unexpected delivery of combat forces into a guerrilla-held or

contested area provides significant advantages to the counterguerrilla

commander. If caught by surprise, the guerrilla maybe

unable to react in time to save himself. He is confused initially and
may panic. In the time it takes him to become aware of the tactical

situation, or to take effective action, the counterguerrilla forces

may encircle him. Speed and surprise may be achieved by using

air assault tactics to insert the first counterguerrilla forces into

the area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on later

airlifts or by other modes of transportation.

j. Strike forces are most vulnerable just after entering a new area of

operations. Initially, there is some confusion until patrol bases

are established and patrols are sent out. counterguerrilla forces

must be especially security conscious the first few hours in a new

location. Upon arrival, they should immediately establish target

reference points, observation posts, and listening posts.

Section IV. Consolidation Campaigns

3-14. Control.

a. This section provides the brigade guidance on the missions,

organization, and operations of consolidation compaigns.

Consolidation campaigns are the application of all civil and

military aspects of internal defense and internal development

programs. They are designed to establish, regain, or maintain

control of specific areas.

b. The brigade participates in consolidation campaigns by conducting

tactical, intelligence, psychological, civil affairs, populace and

resources control, and advisory assistance operations.

c. Brigades committed to consolidation campaigns support the

overall host country internal defense and development (IDAD)

effort by applying their resources in the following manner:

(1) In the preparation and offensive phases, tactical operations

are stressed. Initial area control is established by clearing

guerrilla forces from an area, expanding it, and linking it to

other areas as they are cleared.

(2) In the development phase, the primary mission is tactical

operations to maintain security of the cleared area. Concurrently,

the brigade performs intelligence, psychological,

populace and resources control, civil affairs, and advisory

assistance operations. The brigade also conducts military-civic

action in conjunction with civil affairs programs.

(3) During the completion phase, when guerrilla activity within

a consolidated area has been largely neutralized and host

country agencies have resumed control of the area, the

brigade begins to phase out its participation in local

operations and prepares to conduct operations in another

area.

3-15. Preparatory phase.

Consolidation campaign plans are detailed and provide for long-range

commitment of both personnel and materiel. Plans are coordinated

with all agencies involved in the consolidation campaign. In addition

to planning, the brigade conducts necessary training and becomes
 engaged in intelligence and other FID activities